U.S. Lacks the Strategic Empathy Required for Success with North Korea
April 28, 2021
By Robert McCoy
During a twenty-year career in the U.S. Air Force as an intelligence professional, Robert McCoy lived in East Asia for more than fourteen years.
The history of U.S. failures over the decades of dealing with North Korea is due to a single factor: the inability of too many diplomats and political advisers to understand Asia in general and North Korea in particular.
American failures over decades of dealing with North Korea are largely due to a single factor: the inability to understand Asia in general and North Korea in particular. Washington lacks strategic empathy, a term discussed in a paper published in 2014. Strategic empathy is simply the critical ability to perceive reality through the eyes of others, and to correctly perceive how they would likely act – or react – within the parameters of their own experiences, strengths, and weaknesses in any given context.
No American administration, Democratic or Republican, has had sufficient strategic empathy to deal effectively with North Korea regarding denuclearization – or any other issue. All have failed to grasp what drives Pyongyang, and lacking that comprehension, negotiations with the Kim dynasty haven’t had lasting success. This has allowed North Korea to develop a hydrogen bomb and an inter-continental ballistic missile capable of striking the American homeland, to say nothing about U.S. military facilities in the Pacific or American allies in the region.
Questions thus arise as to whether President Joe Biden’s choices for top positions in the U.S. Department of State and the National Security Council will fare any better. If this is indeed the Asian Century and if the United States is serious about shifting its focus to that part of the globe, Biden’s people must “get” Asia.
However, Biden’s picks for State leadership do not inspire confidence, given that four are from former President Barack Obama’s foreign policy team with its do-nothing-because-we-know-nothing policy of “strategic patience.” For example, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in October 2016 that Washington’s goal was to have North Korea completely, verifiably, irreversibly denuclearize. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper had declared a few days earlier that such an objective was “probably a lost cause.“ Still, Blinken continues to chase denuclearization.
Moreover, Biden’s choice for Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman seems unaware that history continues to influence current events in Asia. As a former social worker, Sherman ought to understand better than most the pain borne by “comfort women,” the euphemism for Korean women forced into sexual slavery for Imperial Japanese soldiers during Tokyo’s subjugation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Yet, Sherman callously badgered the South Korean government in December 2015 to settle the festering issue with Tokyo without concern for Seoul’s perspective.
Kurt Campbell, another Obama-era envoy, is Biden’s Indo-Pacific Coordinator. Campbell’s lack of strategic empathy is best illustrated by his recent co-authored piece in which he repeatedly cites Henry Kissinger, a noted Europeanist, as a guide. Despite numerous attempts, one cannot view Asia through a European lens. Kissinger greatly misunderstood China in the early 1970s, wishfully thinking that Washington could shape Beijing’s entry into the liberal world order and make it a global partner that would follow international rules established by the West. Strategic empathy would have warned otherwise. China, with its rich history of dealing with lesser polities in the region, didn't’t kowtow to a brash young Western nation. Beijing views itself as the rightful hegemon in Asia and intends to follow its own playbook.
Campbell also ignores China’s actions in recent years to enforce its debunked claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea and Beijing’s ongoing predatory lending practices in countries that have haplessly joined its Belt and Road Initiative. Rather, Campbell’s thoughts are quixotically conditioned on “if the country plays by the rules,” something Beijing rarely does.
Understanding China is critical in dealing with North Korea because Beijing won’t let Pyongyang fail. China does not want an influx of Korean refugees into its northeastern provinces that already have a sizable population of ethnic Koreans whose loyalties might waver in times of turbulence on the Korean Peninsula. Nor does Beijing want a unified Korea as a capitalistic and democratic state on its doorstep.
Biden has also appointed Jung Pak as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian & Pacific Affairs, who acknowledges that nuclear weapons are codified as part of North Korea’s national identity and who avers that Washington must learn from its past failings with Pyongyang. But despite admitting that North Korea’s Kim Jong Un is highly unlikely to relinquish his nukes and missiles, Pak now declares that Washington must keep maximum pressure on Pyongyang to do just that. Her grasp of the situation ought to contraindicate that ill-chosen goal.
To summarize bluntly, Biden’s choices to deal with North Korea are ill-suited for the task.
The United States has long contended that meeting directly with any North Korean leader – founder Kim Il Sung, follow-on ruler son Kim Jong Il, or current leader grandson Kim Jong Un – would serve only to legitimize the regime. Yet even as they decry the illegitimacy of North Korea, many of Washington’s diplomats and political advisers claim that discussions with Pyongyang are the only way to solve the problem of North Korea’s nuclear threat.
Moreover, precedents abound for establishing formal relations with undesirable regimes. Just look at some of the regimes with which the United States has relations today.
Diplomatic blinders prevent seeing reality.
However, the issue is not whether to negotiate, but what to negotiate. Negotiating to convince Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear weapons – its “treasured sword” – is a fool’s errand. One must recognize that North Korea felt compelled to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea devoted decades of effort and most of its national treasure to create a formidable defense against its main enemy the United States. During the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, American forces had demolished North Korea. Understandably, Pyongyang still harbors much ill will toward Washington.
Subsequently, U.S. involvement in Vietnam reminded Pyongyang that Washington could invade a small country at will. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which had no nuclear weapons, resulted in the death of its leader Saddam Hussein. In 2011, Washington’s overt political support for, and covert military involvement in, the overthrow of the Libyan government, which had earlier abandoned its nascent nuclear weapons program, led to the demise of its leader Muammar Gaddafi. The lessons of these events were not lost on North Korea.
With miniaturized nuclear weapons and various road-mobile delivery systems, North Korea now effectively deters any American attack for two reasons. First, even though the United States could ultimately destroy North Korea, Pyongyang would still be able to inflict a nuclear nightmare on several American cities before going down. Second, Pyongyang is able to hold hostage nearby American allies Japan and South Korea. If North Korea were attacked by the United States, Pyongyang would almost assuredly retaliate against Seoul and Tokyo.
The perspective of the regime
One must employ strategic empathy to assess whether Kim Jong Un might disarm. In truth, it would be more illuminating to discuss his motivations to not disarm, but first things first.
The United States has in the past dangled the benefits of North Korea developing some form of market economy to improve the standard of living in the impoverished nation. Kim remains uninterested in that. He is content with his own state-regulated economy with a few small-scale capitalistic endeavors. More capitalism would diminish the importance of the state in providing what little it does for the average citizen and introduce the evils of Western influences.
What Kim wants is sanctions relief. And indeed, the entire country likely would benefit from sanctions relief. Unfortunately, this is where Washington misreads the situation due to a lack of strategic empathy. Improving the life of everyday North Koreans is not the regime’s primary concern. What drives the interest in sanctions relief is that lifting restrictions on what Pyongyang can export and import would make it easier to obtain war matériel for the military and to acquire luxury goods for the elites. Concern for the average citizen is limited to only what is required to ensure the continuation of the regime.
Kim personally has every luxury imaginable: all creature comforts and physical pleasures are at his beck and call. Moreover, his small and otherwise unremarkable state has the considerable distinction of consistently frustrating the most powerful nation in the history of the world. Possessing absolute power is an untreatable addiction that Kim has no interest in curing.
Thus, Kim has no motivation to disarm. The hardships and deprivations of common folk in North Korea are sacrifices for the good of the regime borne by dispensable persons. Kim is almost exclusively focused on maintaining the allegiance of the elites and the support of the military to ensure his own survival. The United States must change its negotiating goal from complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization to something attainable.
That something is a form of détente, similar to what Washington eventually negotiated first with Moscow and then with Beijing. Those precedents strongly suggest it can be done with Pyongyang.
Importantly, recent history demonstrates Pyongyang does not engage in provocative rhetoric or hostile activities while it is in discussions with Washington – if North Korea believes that it can gain something of benefit at minor cost. This bears repeating: If North Korea perceives that sitting down with the United States would be of benefit without significant expense, Pyongyang will seek discussions.
Perhaps the best example is the charm offensive that Pyongyang mounted during the 2018 Winter Olympics held in South Korea. That effort led to the two summits between Kim and Trump in 2018 and 2019, even though nothing substantive came from them.
Two important lessons emerged from those summits in which North Korea sought major sanctions relief. The first is that complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization was a cost too great for Pyongyang and that major sanctions relief was a price too high for Washington. The second is that both sides misjudged the other – a double failure of strategic empathy.
The “Dance of Deceit” leads to toes being stepped on
A review of North Korean behavior over several decades reveals that when North Korea wants something from the United States, it seeks Washington’s attention by beginning a series of geopolitical maneuvers I call the "Dance of Deceit."
The dance begins when North Korea wants something. The regime tries to gain the attention of the United States, initially through subtle messaging, but if Washington fails to respond appropriately, Pyongyang resorts to threatening rhetoric or small-scale hostile actions. When the United States does attend to events, discussions may ensue, but if some agreement is reached – getting to “yes” is not a given – Pyongyang demands that the United States upholds its part of the bargain first. North Korea then always – always – finds or invents excuses to avoid having to fulfill its own commitments.
Kim is now trying the dance anew with President Biden. The question is whether the United States still has two left feet.
No strategic empathy means failure
North Korean negotiators often best their American counterparts by using less common meanings of words or imprecise phrasings that provide them with “wiggle room” when issues such as scope of agreement or verification arise. And when American negotiators attempt to nail down terms up front, the North Koreans balk just as they did when Kim and Trump could not agree on what nuclear facilities would be covered or which sanctions would be rescinded during their inconclusive February 2019 summit in Hanoi.
Those Pyongyang-Washington summits exposed the difficulties in negotiating with North Korea and the lack of strategic empathy by the United States. One has to be concerned whether Biden’s team of recycled players can achieve anything of lasting value with North Korea. That will be possible only if Team Biden fully understands North Korea’s position and goals.
Secretary Blinken announced that the State Department would do a “full review of the U.S. approach” to Pyongyang, but he clarified that the effort was only to find ways to force North Korea into negotiations about denuclearization. And Biden himself has insisted that complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is necessary.
Both statements are in bewildering contrast to a recent announcement by Sydney Seiler, the top U.S. national intelligence officer for North Korea, that on the part of Pyongyang “every engagement in diplomacy has been designed to further the nuclear program, not to find a way out.” He also asserted that this has been the regime’s policy for three decades.
Thus, with a predetermined conclusion in mind – negotiating afresh to get Pyongyang to denuclearize – any review of Washington’s approach to North Korea will demonstrate yet again that the United States does not understand its Asian adversary. Washington’s approach to Pyongyang will fall short once more unless U.S. negotiators quickly develop strategic empathy.